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Abstract
Political leaders often have private incentives to pursue expensive and socially
wasteful “white elephant” projects. Our argument highlights that weak account-
ability mechanisms allow autocratic leaders to more easily realize such projects,
whereas democratic leaders are more constrained from doing so. We subsequently
test different implications from this argument by drawing on a global dataset record-
ing various features of skyscrapers, a prominent type of modern white elephant.
We find that autocracies systematically build more new skyscrapers than democ-
racies, and this result is robust to controlling for income level, state control over
the economy, and country- and year-fixed effects. Further, autocratic skyscrapers
are more excessive and wasteful than democratic. Autocratic regimes also pur-
sue skyscraper projects no matter if they preside over rural or urban societies. In
contrast, skyscrapers are fewer and – when first built – associated with less waste
in democracies, and they are more frequently built urbanized democracies than in
rural.
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1 Introduction
Democracies outperform autocracies on several policy and development outcomes,
including school enrollment (Lake and Baum 2001), infant mortality rates (Gerring,
Thacker and Alfaro 2012), and productivity change (Knutsen 2015). Yet, recent analysis
suggests that autocracies systematically outpace democracies on various investment and
infrastructure variables (Gerring, Gjerløw and Knutsen 2017). There exist quite different
explanations for this pattern. Some highlight more benevolent motives combined with
the high capacity of autocratic regimes in undertaking large investment projects, sug-
gesting that autocrats pursue productivity-enhancing investments (see Przeworski and
Limongi 1993). The large literature on East Asian development states, for example,
highlight how autocratic regimes bent at increasing income growth have displayed the
autonomy to drive up savings rates, invest in infrastructure, and subsidize capital for
export-producing industrial firms (Leftwich 2000; Wade 1990; Young 1995)
Another explanation, which we elaborate on in this paper, contends that many in-
vestments made in autocracies are actually not very productivity-enhancing, and rather
reflect less sanguine motivations on the part of leaders. Historically, numerous autocrats
have funded, subsidized, or otherwise encouraged large-scale investment and infrastruc-
ture projects for reasons such as vanity, one example being Mussolini building the exceed-
ingly expensive EUR district in Rome in the 1930s, planned for a World Fair that would
celebrate 20 years of fascist rule in Italy in 1942. Such projects can also provide cronies of
the regime with opportunities for reaping excessive profits or bribes. One recent example
is the profiteering of private contractors with ties to the Putin regime before the 2014
Sochi Winter Olympics, as many contractors were heavily subsidized through the state
bank Vnesheconombank (see, e.g., Yaffa 2014). Extravagant projects such as the EUR
and Sochi Olympics can also be used to signal the regime’s capabilities and strength to
foreign allies and competitors. No matter what the more specific motivation is, autocratic
leaders have personal reasons to pursue costly, but mostly unproductive (from a societal
point of view), investments – often referred to as white elephant projects.
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A large theoretical political-economy literature has highlighted how various institu-
tional features that affect either vertical accountability, horizontal accountability, or con-
trol of corruption – all of which are typically present to a larger extent in democracies
than in autocracies – could limit the “rents” that leaders appropriate (e.g., Ferejohn 1986;
Lake and Baum 2001; Przeworski 2000). But despite this, and despite the numerous ex-
amples of historical and contemporary autocrats undertaking white elephant projects,
we lack comprehensive and systematic evidence on whether autocratic leaders are, in
fact, more likely than democratic leaders to pursue such projects.1 This is likely the
result of the lack of measures of white elephant projects that are amenable to comparison
across space and time. We thus contribute to the literature by conducting a systematic
empirical analysis of how autocratic and democratic countries differ on one prominent
modern type of white elephant, namely skyscrapers (which, as we discuss below, often
constitute a substantial net drag on public resources). Our empirical analysis employs a
global dataset with extensive time series, drawing from an impressive online archive of
buildings created by The Skyscraper Center (CTBUH 2016a).
We find that when countries become more autocratic, they subsequently build more
new skyscrapers, controlling for other relevant factors, such as level of income and ur-
banization. This result is neither due to skyscrapers being more popular in particular
countries (e.g., China or Kuwait) that happen to be autocratic, nor to skyscrapers being
1Several cross-national measures of political and administrative corruption exists, and
have been used to asses links with democracy (e.g., Rock 2009). However most mea-
sures rely on perceptions of corruption, which may be artificially inflated in democratic
countries with a free press and higher transparency, thus generating biased estimates
(see, e.g., Knutsen 2010). Some recent empirical studies with relevance for the topic of
leaders and rents have employed creative designs and satellite data on nighttime light
activity to investigate how local economic activity in a region increases when the chief
executive comes from that region (Hodler and Raschky 2014). Yet other studies, more
directly related to ours, have investigated how (local) political leaders and elite coalitions
manage to expend public resources on excessively costly sports stadiums (e.g., Delaney
and Eckstein 2003).
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built with greater frequency in certain time periods where autocracies proliferate, as the
results are clear even when controlling for country- and year-fixed effects. The result is
robust to employing alternative estimation techniques, omitting countries that have never
built any skyscrapers, and controlling for different sets of confounders. It is also robust
to employing different operationalizations of our dependent variable such as counting
the number of new skyscrapers, number of additional meters of skyscrapers, including
or excluding industrial structures and telecommunications masts in our measures, etc.
The result holds up when we investigate sub-samples, for instance only using data from
more recent decades. We also control for state involvement in the economy and conduct
validity checks on our data in order to ensure that results are not simply driven by differ-
ential propensities of democratic and autocratic private sector actors to build skyscrapers
(that are unrelated to political factors). The validity checks involve gauging the state- or
regime ties of contracting firms and public financing for 100 randomly selected skyscraper
projects.
Different extensions of this analysis corroborate the theoretical notion that autocrats
encourage the building of skyscrapers for reasons of self-interest rather than for the reason
that skyscrapers fill any vital economic function: We introduce more targeted measures
capturing the “vanity” of building projects, such as the number or percentage of excessive
meters of skyscrapers – i.e. the distance from the top of the building to the highest occu-
pied floor – and show that autocracies are systematically associated with these measures.
These results are even stronger when we conduct matching analysis at the building level,
allowing us to only compare otherwise similar types of buildings in democracies and au-
tocracies. Yet, not all skyscrapers are white elephants and skyscrapers are more likely to
be socially productive investments in, for instance, wealthy and highly urbanized societies
than in poor and largely rural. We thus conduct interaction tests, and these results also
corroborate our argument: whereas the building of skyscrapers in democracies closely
follows income and urbanization, autocratic regimes build (more) skyscrapers regardless
of whether they preside over a rich or poor, or an urban or rural, society. When investi-
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gating the mechanisms, we find suggestive evidence that the relationship between regime
type and skyscrapers is, to a large extent, driven by vertical accountability mechanisms
and well-informed democratic voters disciplining politicians into not pursuing skyscraper
projects. We do not find clear evidence that democracies build fewer skyscrapers due to
stronger horizontal checks on leaders or because they are less corrupt.
In the next section, we provide some illustrative examples of white elephants and
discuss leaders’ motivations for pursuing them, before we discuss why skyscrapers can
be considered white elephants. Thereafter, we lay out the more general argument on
why autocratic leaders expectedly pursue more (costly) white elephant projects than
democratic. In the following section, we discuss our data and empirical design. In the
penultimate section, we present our empirical results on different features of skyskcrapers,
before we conclude.
2 Autocrats and White Elephants
Why would any leader want to expend public resources on projects that cost more
than the revenue they are expected to bring in? After all, such projects funnel scarce
resources away from productive investments or goods and services widely desired by
citizens. One straightforward answer is that white elephants could enhance the (private)
utility of political leaders:
2.1 White elephants, and why leaders want them
White elephants come in different forms. Take, for example, excessively expensive
palaces. Among the most prominent palaces is the Versailles, the luxurious residency of
French royalty (and selected aristocrats) up until the French revolution. The cost of the
Versailles is uncertain, but records such as the “Comptes des Batiments du roi sous le
regne de Louis XIV” indicate a pricetag of more than 2 billion 1994 US Dollars (Guiffrey
1901). French peasants and other taxpayers were stuck with an enormous cost, while
the palace and parks were privately enjoyed by their leaders. A more recent example is
the presidential palace in Ankara, initiated by Turkish President Erdogan. This building
holds 1150 rooms extending over 300 000 m2, and is estimated to cost Turkish tax payers
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$615m. While the costs of such projects are substantial – and has to be covered by
increased taxes, reduced public spending in other areas, or debt – they yield obvious
private gains for leaders.
Leaders could pursue white elephants also for other reasons than direct personal con-
sumption. Leaders, as other people, are motivated by a number of things. Put differently,
the utility function of leaders can incorporate various arguments other than private con-
sumption, and the weight of these arguments vary with the leader in question. Some
leaders may be strongly motivated by religious convictions, and large and expensively
decorated religious buildings constitute another type of historically prominent white ele-
phant.2
Further, many leaders – like other people – want to be famous and talked about,
and prefer being viewed as powerful, capable or aﬄuent. Large buildings – but also
other remarkable projects and events such as high-speed trains, enormous dams, and
major sports events where leaders can attend and lead ceremonies – function as expensive
symbols. These symbols can help leaders shape the perceptions of their country’s, and
by extension their own, aﬄuence, capabilities or power. In other words, buildings may
serve as specific and identifiable representations of the country and its leadership that
2For example, Binnya U, conveniently nicknamed the “Lord of White Elephant” (he
actually had a white elephant as a pet), rebuilt the Shwedagon Pagoda to 20 meters in
the 14th century. Burmese heads of state have later added 80 more meters and golden
plating around the whole structure, put a crown on top with 5448 diamonds and 2317
rubies, and a final bud on the top in 15 grams 76 carat diamond (Wikipedia 2016). In
2009, the Burmese military regime completed a replica of the Shwedagon Pagoda in their
(“artificial”, recently erected) capitol Naypyidaw, but this latter structure is completely
hollow on the inside – The Lord of White Elephant would probably have been proud. To
take another example, President Fe´lix Houphoue¨t-Boigny built the “Basilica of our Lady
of Peace” in Yammasoukrou, Cote d’Ivoire, which was to replicate the Peter’s Basilica
in Rome in terms of architectural style but with an extra 30 meters to its size. This
cathedral is estimated to have doubled the country’s national debt (Mark 2015), in a
country where only about 20 percent of the population are Catholic (CIA 2016).
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help make them visible and alter their reputation abroad or among certain domestic
audiences. Illustratively, many expensive buildings are aptly named after the leader.
Projecting power through expensive white elephants can also be an effective strategy for
dictators seeking to establish and secure their own position, or for an authoritarian party
to further establish its hold on power. As Svolik (2012, p. 80) notes, “[u]nder established
autocracy, the dictator’s outward appearance of invincibility is as important as his actual
power.” Insofar as white elephants signal aﬄuence and power, they can contribute to
co-opt opposition members, or at least deter potential uprisings, by altering beliefs about
the chances of successfully contesting the regime (Kuran 1995; Fearon 1995).
2.2 Skyscrapers as white elephants
One type of modern-day white elephant that fits such a power-projecting purpose is
the skyscraper. Being visible and impressive modern structures, skyscrapers provide an
easily recognizable symbol for a city, or even a country and its regime, and bring interna-
tional attention and legitimacy (in a similar fashion to the palaces and churches of older
days). As suggested by a description of the Jeddah Tower – the 1000 meter tall building
under construction in Saudi Arabia – extravagant skyscrapers can serve to “emanate the
growth, prosperity, and regional emergence of its homeland on the global stage” (CTBUH
2016b). Thus, leaders may prefer building skyscrapers in order to physically display the
country’s – and by extension its leadership’s – wealth, power and capabilities.
Regarding the cost-effectiveness of skyscrapers, this admittedly depends on a range of
factors, including how the building is constructed but also the land value in the particular
location – more floors allow for more square meters of office or residential space per square
meter of land. Building a given skyscraper may carry net economic gains in Manhattan,
but not in Dubai or Kigali. Yet, building very tall skyscrapers is, in general, very costly.
To take one extreme example, the mentioned Jeddah Tower is projected to cost about $
1.2 billion upon completion in 2019 – a back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that this
sum is equivalent to the total annual public expenditures for a country such as Rwanda
(in 2014).
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Thus, cost-inefficient skyscrapers are – as we provide evidence of below – often built or
part-financed by states, or by actors with access to public resources such as state-owned
enterprises or nominally private firms with strong (family or other) ties to the leader. To
name examples, the estimated 400 million US Dollar Khan Shatyr Entertainment Centre
in Astana, Kazakhstan and the estimated 306 million USD SOCAR Tower in Baku, Azer-
baijan, were both fully government financed, and so were the Gunma Prefectural Gov-
ernment Building in Maebashi, Japan, and the Euromast in Rotterdam, the Netherlands.
In other cases, owners, CEOs and other key operative in the main contractor company
has strong government connections; the key figures in many of the Chinese skypscraper
contractors we investigated, for example, have histories from the Chinese Communist
Party. In some instances, skyscrapers are even built without being used for any further
revenue-generating purpose.3 One example is the Ryugyong Hotel – also known as The
Tower of Doom – in Pyongyang; a 330 meters towering pyramid on which construction
started in 1987, but which remains unoccupied even today. In sum, skyscrapers often
constitute white (or at least whitely shaded) elephants.
2.3 Why democracies may build fewer and less expensive skyscrapers than
autocracies: Three potential mechanisms
Our main hypothesis is that autocracies build more skyscrapers than democracies, ev-
erything else equal. A second hypothesis is that autocracies build more wasteful skyscrap-
ers than democracies. We outline three different types of mechanisms which, if operative,
should all contribute to generating these relationships:
First, well-functioning vertical accountability mechanisms – notably related to regular,
competitive elections linking the fortunes of leaders to the preferences of their electorates
3Granted, there may be (hard-to-measure) economic benefits to building skyscrapers
in countries that are potential tourist destinations. Some structures, such as the Eiffel
Tower, have likely yielded net benefits to the domestic economy by attracting tourists.
If both democratic and autocratic leaders and populations in potential tourist countries
recognize this, it should contribute to attenuate any relationship between regime type
and skyscrapers.
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(see, e.g., Ferejohn 1986) – should mitigate the pursuit of white elephant projects in
democracies. Contested multi-party elections provide dissatisfied citizens with a chan-
nel for removing incumbents that expend resources on costly and ineffective projects.
Democratic leaders will thus more likely anticipate future personal costs from pursuing
white elephants, because such projects mitigate their chances of re-election. Yet, well-
functioning vertical accountability mechanisms presume not only that principals (i.e.,
citizens) are able to freely select and remove their agents (i.e., leaders), but also that the
principals are well-informed about the agents’ actions (Besley 2006). One key feature of
democratic politics is thus that it often provides a richer and more critical information
environment than in autocracies. Political competition and arenas for free public de-
bate help inform voters about the costs and benefits of various policies (e.g., Dahl 1971).
Opposition parties or independent media outlets, with the opportunities and incentives
to spread information on the costs of, e.g., large-scale construction projects, will make
citizens better aware of the dark side of white elephants. Forward-looking leaders should
under these conditions rather channel public resources to presumably more popular items
such as primary education, health clinics and local roads (e.g., Harding 2015).4
4Skyscrapers may be conceptualized not only as white elephant projects, but also as
a particular instance of rent (conceived broadly as any type of personal gain for the
leader, not only monetary). Numerous theoretical models – formal and informal – ad-
dress rent-seeking by political leaders, highlighting the conditions under which leaders
can select policies for private gain despite the wider social costs (see, e.g., Rowley, Tolli-
son and Tullock 1988). A key insight is that this “moral hazard” problem is exacerbated
under circumstances of weak or no institutionalized mechanisms of accountability and
when information is asymmetric and opaque (see, e.g., Laffont and Martimort 2002).
Other scholars address how these circumstances also amplify issues of “adverse selection”
(Besley 2006). In our context, if citizens are able to screen and select “better” and more
honest leaders, or leaders that hold basically similar policy preferences as themselves,
there would be less of an agency problem associated with leaders pursuing white ele-
phant projects. Given that competitive elections and institutions ensuring transparent
information to voters are perceived to mitigate not only moral hazard but also adverse
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Second, well-functioning checks and balances in democracies – stemming from insti-
tutions and actors outside the executive being empowered to affect policy making and
veto executive decisions – provide horizontal accountability mechanisms restraining lead-
ers. These relate, for instance, to requirements of passing spending bills through the
legislature; even though a democratically elected prime minister may prefer to spend on
a white elephant, legislators accountable to voters in their district may be less eager to
do so (particularly when the elephant is located outside their district). Hence, a leg-
islature empowered to constrain the chief executive is one key institutional feature for
mitigating wasteful projects in democracies (see North and Weingast 1989), but many
democracies display also other constraining institutions, such as an independent judiciary.
In contrast, the relatively weaker institutional constraints placed on autocratic leaders
should enable autocrats to pursue various policies that they privately prefer with less
interference, including white elephant projects.
Third, autocracies may observe more skyscrapers due to the nature of links between
political leaders and their core supporters. All leaders rely on the support of some
key constituencies, but in autocracies these constituencies tend to be less encompassing
(Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003) and often dominated by economic elites (e.g., Acemoglu
and Robinson 2006). Large-scale construction projects is one helpful tool for autocratic
leaders wanting to please their rich and relatively few key supporters, as over-priced
building contracts can be used to secretively transfer resources. Even in the absence of
such corruption, business elites may prefer public resources being spent on financing or
subsidizing skyscrapers – for example through direct transfers, tax breaks, or the govern-
ment providing cheap inputs – rather than financing, say, primary schools or clinics in
rural areas. Indeed, political power concentration with economic elites may lead to more
skyscrapers in autocracies even if these skyscrapers are fully financed by private actors.
This is because economic elites may influence leaders into pursuing regulatory and other
selection, this bolsters the prediction that democracies, due to stronger vertical account-
ability mechanisms, should observe fewer white elephants than autocracies.
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policies of relevance for the building of (also privately financed) skyscrapers. One specific
regulatory policy of obvious relevance pertains to maximum height limits on buildings in
major cities, but also the implementation of zoning plans and provision of complementary
infrastructure may affect the possibility for private actors to build skyscrapers.
If at least one of these three mechanisms are operative, we should observe that fewer –
and less expensive – skyscraper projects are initiated in democracies than in autocracies.
Yet, the three mechanisms that might connect regime type to skyscrapers are presented
in a stylized fashion, and there are plausible counter-arguments, or at least caveats, to
all of them:
Regarding vertical accountability, also autocrats may be restricted in their actions
by the broader public, if not through free and fair elections then through anticipated
reactions such as protests, riots and revolts (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Svolik
2012). Further, vertical accountability mechanisms may operate with varying degrees
of strength also in democracies.5 Notably, even when freedom of speech and media are
formally ensured, the true costs of grand projects may sometimes be hidden from the
public by democratic governments, thereby mitigating the unpopularity of white elephant
projects. This is particularly pertinent in democracies where independent or opposition
newspapers or broadcast media are negligible. Regarding horizontal accountability, auto-
cratic leaders are seldom all-powerful, as their decision-making powers are restricted by,
e.g., regime parties and multi-party legislatures (e.g., Gandhi 2008; Svolik 2012; Wright
2008). Likewise, some democratic leaders operate within systems that have relatively
few institutional veto players (Tsebelis 2002). Regarding links with key supporters, also
democratic leaders, more than occasionally, engage in corrupt activities (e.g., Rock 2009),
and economic elite groups may carry disproportionately large influence over politics also
in democracies (Przeworski 2010; Albertus and Menaldo 2014). These caveats imply that
5Vertical accountability may, e.g., be weaker in cases such as South Africa where the
ANC has not faced any major opposition party or realistic prospects of government
alternation.
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the link between regime type and skyscrapers remains an open empirical question. They
also imply that we may observe a systematic correlation between measures of media and
the information environment, horizontal checks on leaders, corruption, and the concen-
tration of political power with economic elites, on the one hand, and measures pertaining
to skyscraper projects, on the other, even when controlling for degree of democracy.
3 Data
3.1 The skyscraper database and dependent variable operationalizations
We collected the data on skyscrapers from The Skyscraper Center. This impressive
online database, which is constantly updated by the Council for Tall Buildings and Urban
Habitats (CTBUH 2016a), includes all known human constructions taller than 150 meters
(plus numerous lower buildings). The database also includes proposed buildings, build-
ings on hold, buildings under construction, and demolished constructions. With varying
coverage, buildings are accompanied with information on, e.g., their function, construc-
tion materials, number of floors, elevators (and their speed), etc. We developed and
employed an automated data-scraping technique to convert the information into formats
amenable to our purpose (see Appendix A.1 for details), resulting in one country-year
and one building-level dataset. The former is our main dataset, while the latter is used
for robustness tests.
Since coverage is incomplete for buildings lower than 150 meters, and the selection
criteria are unclear, we restrict our operationalization of skyscrapers to buildings taller
than 150 meters where we (at least in principle) have full coverage. There are 7853 such
structures in our dataset. Several of these are only unrealized plans or visions, and after
removing these and buildings that were never completed or put on hold, we are left with
5048 structures ≥ 150 meters. This criterion sets a fairly high threshold for counting
a building as a skyscraper, which has another notable benefit: Shorter buildings are
generally both far less costly to construct and less impressive structures. Hence, buildings
of, say, about 100 meters tall are less likely to constitute white elephant projects of
theoretical interest than buildings exceeding 150 meters. Further, our baseline excludes
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industrial structures (e.g., factories with very tall chimneys) and telecommunications
masts, as categorized by CTBUH (2016a), to obtain a more homogeneous measure. We
consider these constructions to be quite different from the other tall structures included,
and our theoretical notion of skyscrapers as modern white elephants, as they (and their
height) have a specific economic function related to, respectively, industrial manufacturing
and telecommunications. This leaves us with 4925 relevant skyscrapers. Yet, we show
in Appendix Table A.4 that including industrial plants and telecommunication masts
or experimenting with alternative cut-offs on skyscraper height only marginally affects
results.
Figure 1 plots meters and completion year for all tall structures recorded in the CT-
BUH database. It illustrates that tall buildings become more frequent in recent decades,
and that the very tallest buildings have become taller. Construction technologies have
improved since the early 20th century, and previous “World’s tallest” such as the 170
meter Washington Monument or even the 300 meter Eiffel Tower fade in the shadow of
today’s tallest structures. When excluding towers and masts, three current buildings ex-
ceed 600 meters, and these “mega-structures” are located in Mecca, Shanghai and Dubai.6
This points to the importance of accounting for time-period effects in our regressions –
particularly since also the share of relatively democratic countries has changed over time.
For certain buildings, information is available on both year when the construction
began, and when the building was completed. We leverage this to inform the time-lag
used for our covariates. A few buildings took several decades to build, but for almost
the entire time-period, the typical skyscraper took between 3 and 4 years to construct
(see Appendix Figure A.1). Thus, in our main specifications, we lag all independent
variables with 3 years to reflect the time it takes for deciding on a building project to it
being finalized.7 This should also contribute to mitigate potential reverse causality issues
6Interestingly, while all “mega-structures” have come after the “third wave of democra-
tization” (Huntington 1991), only political regimes without competitive national elections
have (so far) built them.
7While there is no clear theoretical rationale for preferring 3-year to 4-year lags, this
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Figure 1: Evolution of tall structures during the 20th century
(which we, in any case, assume are minor for this particular relationship): There is little
reason to expect that the number of new skyscrapers built, e.g., in the year 2000 should
strongly affect the level of democracy in 1997.
We construct three different types of dependent variables from these data. The first
pertains to the number of new skyscrapers in a country in a given year. While we also
test models using the raw number of new skyscrapers, the right-skewed nature of this
dependent variable means that we mainly employ the natural logarithm of (change in
number of skyscraper from one year to the next +1). Formally,
ln(∆Si,t + 1) = ln(Si,t − Si,t−1 + 1) (1)
where S is the number of skyscrapers, i denotes the country, and t denotes the year. For
allows us to incorporate more observations. Appendix Table A.9 shows that results are
stable to using the alternative lag structure.
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more than 90 percent of our country-years, this variable takes the value 0 (which is also
the theoretical minimum value). Thus, we test various specifications – including zero-
inflated negative binomial and Tobit regressions – that are attentive to this aspect of the
distribution of the dependent variable, in addition to our benchmark OLS specifications.
Second, we employ the (log-transformed) number of skyscraper-meters built in a given
year. This measure allows us to capture that some countries may not only build more
skyscrapers, but also taller (and thus more expensive) skyscrapers than others. We again
mainly rely on the logarithmic transformation (equivalent to in Equation 1) in order to
deal with the skewed distribution, but complement this with analysis on the raw count
of new skyscraper-meters.
Figure 2: The ten buildings in the world with the highest number of vanity meters.
Notes: Vanity meters are represented by the colored (top) part of the buildings. Please
note that the scale differs on the non-vanity (bottom) part of the buildings. Source: The
illustration is taken from CTBUH (2013).
Third, we employ measures of “vanity height”, defined as the distance between the
highest occupiable floor and the architectural top of the structure, as illustrated by Figure
2. These are spires or empty spaces on the top of a structure, which can comprise a
large part of some skyscrapers. The 828 meter tall Burj Khalifa in Dubai carries 244
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meters of vanity height – 29 % of the total height. If these 244 meters were a separate
building in Europe, they would be the 11th tallest structure on the continent (CTBUH
2013). With this variable, we aim to capture height that has a symbolic function –
which could still be in leaders’ private interest according to our theoretical argument –
but no clear economic function except, perhaps, attracting some extra tourists. We try
out different specifications, including ln (vanity meters+1), absolute number of vanity
meters, and vanity meters as percentage share of total building height, both for the
entire building mass of skyscrapers and only for “signal buildings” such as the tallest
skyscraper constructed that year.
3.2 Independent variables
Our baseline measure of political regime type is Polyarchy (Teorell et al. 2016) from
V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2016a,b; Pemstein et al. 2015). This is a carefully constructed
measure of the (core) electoral aspect of democracy. It builds on the Polyarchy concept
from Dahl (1971), which considers the extent of competitiveness of elite selection and
how broad popular participation is in this selection process. More specifically, Polyarchy
includes indicators on whether or not the chief executive is (directly or indirectly) elected,
“cleanness” of elections, freedoms of association and speech, and suffrage extension. A
weighted combination of additive and multiplicative aggregation is used in order to cap-
ture the partial substitutability between these indicators (Teorell et al. 2016), and the
measure ranges from 0–1.
We control for different factors that may plausibly affect the building of skyscrap-
ers and correlate with regime type – as for Polyarchy, all controls are lagged by three
years (see Appendix Table A.2 for descriptive statistics). First, we control for income,
measured by log (real, PPP-adjusted) GDP per capita (from Bolt and van Zanden 2014).
Higher income levels could make some skyscraper projects economically beneficial despite
the costs of erecting them, and income correlates strongly with democracy. Further, we
control for log population size (also from Bolt and van Zanden 2014) and urbanization
(from World Development Indicators, via Coppedge et al. 2016a); larger and more urban
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countries should contain more high-rise buildings simply due to scale and pressures for
area-intensive housing. We also control for income per capita from natural resources pro-
duction (fuels and minerals), as coded by Haber and Menaldo (2011). Natural resources
revenue constitutes a particular source of income that leaders can more easily monopolize
and use for pet projects, including the building of skyscrapers, and such income is widely
hypothesized to reduce democratization chances (e.g., Ross 2012).
Our baseline is a simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression with the above-
listed covariates. The baseline also includes country- and year-fixed effects to account for
omitted country-specific factors (e.g., related to geography or some cultural affinity for
building tall structures) as well as global factors (for instance related to building technol-
ogy and architectural trends) that vary over time and may affect the propensity to build
sky-scrapers. We highlight that our results turn out very robust to dropping different
controls (thus further mitigating possible post-treatment bias) and to including addi-
tional controls such as GDP per capita growth in recent years (thus further safeguarding
against omitted variable bias). We also employ alternative estimation techniques, includ-
ing zero-inflated negative binomial models and Tobit regressions. These models provide
us with important sensitivity tests as they account, e.g., for the skewed distribution of
our dependent variables, coming from the fact that several countries in our data material
do not build skyscrapers, and that there is a lower bound (0) to our dependent variables.
We discuss the rationale for testing these more complex (and inherently more sensitive)
specifications in the next section right before the relevant results.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Main tests: Number and Meters of Skyscraper
Model 1 in Table 1 is our benchmark OLS specification, using ln(number of new
skyscrapers in given year + 1) as dependent variable. As expected, Polyarchy, measured
three years prior, is negatively signed and precisely estimated (p < 0.01). This provides
initial support for the hypothesis that autocracies build more skyscrapers than democ-
racies. The signs on the controls are also mostly in the expected direction: As countries
16
become richer, more urbanized, or more populous, they tend to build more skyscrapers.
However, increased natural resource income is associated with fewer skyscrapers, hold-
ing the other covariates constant.8 Figure 3 plots all coefficients from Model 1 with 95
percent confidence intervals.
Polyarchy
ln GDPpc
Percent
urbanization
ln Population
ln Resource
Income pc
−0.3 −0.2 −0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3
Figure 3: Model 1 – Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals on number of new
skyscrapers logged
Our benchmark includes country-fixed effects, thus disallowing any information to be
drawn from comparisons across countries. This makes our very clear results extra notice-
able, since they only draw information from changes to regime type within countries across
time. Model 2 shows that results are fairly similar if we omit the country-fixed effects.
While the Polyarchy coefficient is somewhat attenuated in Model 2, it remains negative
and statistically significant at 1 percent. Hence, autocracies build more skyscrapers also
when we include comparisons across countries, and results are further strengthened if we
exclude USA – which is somewhat of an anomaly by being a democracy with numerous
8Yet we note that one resource-rich country with several tall skyscrapers, namely
the United Arab Emirates, is excluded from the benchmark because of missing data
on Polyarchy.
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skyscrapers – from the sample.9
In the baseline, we logged the number of new skyscrapers due to the skewed distri-
bution. But, Model 3 shows that our main result is robust to using the simple count of
new skyscrapers. The point estimate for Polyarchy suggests that a country going from a
high-quality democracy (1) to a harsh autocracy (0) increases the predicted number of
additional skyscrapers built three years later with 0.8, which is more than twice the mean
number of skyscrapers built in our sample (0.3). The low sample mean reflects the many
country-year observations where no single skyscraper is built. Reassuringly, Polyarchy
remains basically unchanged, dropping by less than ten percent in size, when excluding
all such country-year observations in Model 4, although the t-value in this very reduced
sample is 1.6.
Model 4 thus tries to deal with the issue of numerous zero observations on our de-
pendent variable, but does so in a crude manner. OLS models, in principle, assume an
underlying continuous scale on the dependent variable, and our dependent variable only
measures integral numbers; a country can build 14 or 15 new skyscrapers in a given year,
but not 14.3. We thus tested a Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial model, which is run
in two stages. The first stage separates among the observations that are not building
skyscrapers from those that build at least one; this specification deals with the large
number of 0-observations. The second stage further separates between observations that
build at least one skyscraper, and models a count process for how many they will build,
thus capturing the integral nature of our dependent variable. Interestingly, we do not
find clear evidence that democracies are more (or less) likely than autocracies to be in
the group that builds 0 skyscrapers (see Appendix Table A.13). However, the second
9The result for urbanization is sensitive to omitting the country-fixed effects. When
allowing for comparing across relatively urban and relatively rural countries, the urban-
ization coefficient is now negatively signed. This could stem from omitted variable bias;
countries that are relatively rural in large parts of the time series may be associated
with other political, historical, or cultural features that enhance the propensity to build
skyscrapers.
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stage, reported as Model 5 in Table 1, yields clear evidence that – within the group of
observations building skyscrapers – autocracies build more skyscrapers. Polyarchy is sig-
nificant at 1 percent, and a harsh autocracy (0 on Polyarchy) is predicted to build 1.6
more skyscrapers in year t+ 3 than a high-quality democracy (1 on Polyarchy). Model 6
presents an alternative way of dealing with the fact that a country cannot build a nega-
tive number of skyscrapers, namely a Random Effects Tobit model with 0 as lower-bound
censoring value. Also in this model, autocracies are predicted to build more skyscrapers,
and Polyarchy is significant at 1 percent.10
Returning to our baseline OLS specification, Model 7 employs the logarithmic trans-
formation of the more fine-grained measure capturing additional meters of skyscrapers
built in t + 3. Again, the Polyarchy coefficient is in the expected direction, although
only significant at 10 percent. Once employing the untransformed version of this mea-
sure in Model 8, the result again turns highly significant. The point estimate from this
model suggests that going from a high-quality democracy to a harsh autocracy increases
skyscraper meters built by almost 150 meters in year t + 3, controlling for country- and
year-fixed effects and holding income level, urbanization, population, and resource income
constant.
4.2 Robustness tests
The results in Table 1 do not seem to be driven by omitted variable bias, despite
our relatively sparse baseline specification (see Appendix Section A.4). For example,
short-term economic booms might increase the propensity to build skyscrapers, and such
episodes come more frequently in autocracies (Przeworski et al. 2000). Yet, controlling for
economic growth in the prior 5-/10-year period does not alter the results. Controlling for
other variables, such as international autonomy of the country or occurrence of civil war,
does not weaken results either. For some specifications, such as when adding participation
10We see no theoretical reason to count demolished skyscrapers as negative values on our
dependent variable, nor for excluding demolished buildings from our data. Yet, Appendix
Table A.5 shows that results are robust to excluding demolished buildings.
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in international wars alongside the baseline set of controls, results become somewhat
clearer. Results are also stable to omitting any single control or subsets of controls,
including models only keeping the country- and year-fixed effects, suggesting that the
baseline results are not driven by post-treatment bias either.
Our results are robust to employing alternative measures of democracy, such as Polity2
(Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers 2013) and the dichotomous electoral democracy measure
from Boix, Miller and Rosato (2012). Further, results are robust to making different
operationalization decisions on the dependent variables (Appendix Section A.3), such as
excluding demolished buildings, or excluding data on a few skyscrapers that we suspect
– but cannot ensure, since skyscrapers with identical names and features are sometimes
built as part of complexes – might be duplicates in the dataset. Results are also robust
to omitting the early part of our sample and re-running our models on, e.g., post-1945,
post-1960, and post-1980 samples (Appendix Section A.5).
One key issue remains: The results would not reflect our argument well if they are
primarily driven by systematic differences between democratic and autocratic countries
in the preferences and capabilities of private businesses and real-estate developers to build
skyscrapers that are unrelated to political decisions. We find this unlikely, especially since
we see no clear theoretical reason for why such (non-political) private business incentives
and capabilities to build skyscrapers should be systematically higher in autocracies than
in democracies, especially when conditioning on income level, urbanization, natural re-
source income, and country- and year-specific effects. Our argument rests on the premise
that state actors, regulatory policies and/or public resources influence decisions to build
skyscrapers, and that the influence varies according to regime type. Hence, we first
wanted to check that our results are not driven simply by state-controlled economies
building more (or less) skyscrapers, and that state ownership and control over the econ-
omy, more generally, happens to differ between democracies and autocracies. However,
our results are stable when controlling for the indicator on state ownership and control
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of the economy from V-Dem (see Appendix Table A.7).11
To more directly investigate our key assumption on political involvement in the build-
ing of skyscrapers, we scrutinized a (stratified) random sample of 100 skyscrapers – 50
each in below- and above-median Polyarchy observations. While comparable measures on
the exact amount of state subsidies do not exist, the CTBUH data contain information,
for some observations, on firms involved in the construction process, and for many other
projects such information is available from other online sources.12 More specifically, we
investigate whether skyscrapers are fully or partly publicly funded, whether the involved
firms are state-owned, and whether involved firms are otherwise linked to the political
regime (e.g., owned by a close relative of the leader or a party member). We employed a
conservative routine, only coding state involvement if this was explicitly identifiable from
credible sources.
Among the 50 skyscrapers in relatively democratic countries, we were able to retrieve
information for 46 (92%), whereas the corresponding number is 32 (64%) for autocracies
– this difference dovetails nicely with extant research on regime type and transparency
(Hollyer, Rosendorff and Vreeland 2011). For the skyscrapers where we did find infor-
mation on ownership or financing, we identified state- or regime-affiliated ownership or
financing in 50% of the autocratic skyscrapers, and in 28% of the democratic. Yet, our
conservative coding rules for identifying and registering state involvement, and our in-
formed guess – also based, e.g., on the majority of autocratic skyscrapers with missing
information being located in China, where state financing presumably dominates – is that
our numbers almost certainly underestimate the extent of state involvement, especially in
autocracies. In any case, these findings further corroborate the notion that politics and
11The reason we excluded this variable from our benchmark is that the coding of state
involvement in the economy may be post-treatment to V-Dem country experts observing
that leaders chose to build skyscrapers with state resources.
12Yet, the lack of easily available and transparent information for many buildings, and
especially the ownership status of involved companies, makes this time-consuming to code
(which explains why we investigate only a sample).
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the role of the regime is driving the higher propensity of autocracies to build skyscrapers.
4.3 Which types of skyscrapers do autocrats build and in what contexts do
autocrats build skyscrapers?
So far we have focused on the hypothesis that autocracies build more skyscrapers
than democracies. However, our argument on how autocratic leaders more freely can
pursue projects that yield personal benefits such as glory, recognition or projection of
power, but that are socially very costly, yields other observable implications: First, we
expect autocratic regimes to be systematically associated with economically more wasteful
skyscrapers than democracies. Conditional on skyscrapers being built, autocrats should
be freer to spend more resources on buildings being tall and elegant, and care less about
their economic costs. While we do not have high-quality, comparable data on building
costs and revenue streams generated, we do have proxies that should provide fairly strong
signals on the vanity of skyscraper projects. Second, certain contextual factors should
make building skyscrapers socio-economically more beneficial – or, at least, less wasteful
– and our argument suggests that democratic leaders need to be more attentive to this
than autocratic. Urbanization is an important such contextual factor: Skyscrapers should
make more socio-economic sense in a highly urbanized- than in a rural society. We first
investigate the relationship between regime type and vanity of skyscrapers, before we
turn to the interaction between regime type and urbanization.
To reiterate, our vanity measures leverage information on the distance in meters be-
tween the top of the skyscraper and the highest occupied floor. This is a proxy for the
part of the skyscraper where there is no economic activity. (If autocrats also tend to
build skyscrapers where lower floors are left unoccupied to boost total height of their
constructions, our analysis will thus underestimate the relationship between autocracy
and skyscraper vanity.) Our first specification, Model 1 in Table 2, aggregates the num-
ber for all skyscrapers built in a particular year, and takes the natural logarithm of this
number+1. Otherwise, this model is equivalent to the benchmark from Table 1. As
23
expected, Polyarchy is negative and significant at 1 percent.13
Table 2: Regime type and excessiveness of skyscrapers
Ln vanity meters Absolute vanity meters Vanity percent Max vanity percent
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Polyarchy −0.17∗∗∗ −4.99∗∗∗ −0.08 −0.17∗
(0.04) (1.09) (0.08) (0.09)
Ln GDPpc 0.27∗∗∗ 6.26∗∗∗ 0.02 0.12∗∗
(0.02) (0.57) (0.04) (0.05)
Percent urbanization 0.02 −2.19 0.12 0.22
(0.11) (2.92) (0.22) (0.24)
Ln Population 0.06∗∗ 0.97 0.06 0.07
(0.03) (0.77) (0.06) (0.06)
Ln Resource Income pc −0.03∗∗∗ −0.57∗∗∗ −0.004 −0.01
(0.01) (0.15) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant −2.57∗∗∗ −55.64∗∗∗ −1.02 −1.74
(0.50) (13.87) (1.05) (1.16)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 7353 7353 7353 7353
R-squared 0.26 0.18 0.03 0.05
∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1
All covariates lagged by 3 years
Standard error in paranthesis
This result is robust to using the absolute meters of vanity height built (as always
measured 3 years after the independent variables) in Model 2. When rather using the
percentage of the total new building mass that is vanity height, however, the result turns
statistically insignificant at conventional levels in Model 3. Yet, the percentage share
vanity meters variable is somewhat stronger when we consider only “signal buildings”
rather than the total building mass. The measure used in Model 4 is constructed to
capture that leaders may focus on particular buildings to gain recognition or project
power. More specifically, the measure used in Model 4 is the percentage share of vanity
meters for the tallest skyscraper built in that year, and Polyarchy is negative and weakly
significant in this specification. We conducted various robustness tests, for example
altering the set of covariates, and results often turn clearer for alternative set-ups than
that displayed in Table 2. In sum, there is some, though not entirely robust, evidence
that the skyscrapers built in autocracies are associated with more vanity than those built
in democracies.
13We note that the sample is truncated, relative to in Table 1, because of missing data
on our vanity measure.
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We also employed a very different design to assess this relationship. More specifically,
we constructed a dataset with buildings rather than country-years as units of analysis,
and conducted Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) at the skyscraper-level (see Iacus, King
and Porro 2011). Thus, we only compare otherwise similar buildings that are built in
relatively autocratic and in relatively democratic countries, and test whether the former
is systematically associated with more vanity height. This allows controlling for the
possibility that different types of buildings, for various reasons not related to regime type,
are associated with differences in what we here count as excessive height. Specifically, we
match buildings based on meters (from the ground) to the highest occupied floor, decade
completed, being part of a building complex, and being completely or partly used for
office and/or residential functions. Observations are divided into two groups after the
median Polyarchy value in our dataset.
The estimated average treatment effects from the CEM analysis, for three different
dependent variable operationalizations, are presented in Table 3. Models 1, 2, and 3
employ, respectively, vanity meters as percentage share of skyscraper meters, ln(vanity
meters +1), and vanity meters as dependent variable. The results reinforce the country-
year regression results – Polyarchy is consistently negative and statistically significant at
1 percent. We also tried out very different proxies of the excessiveness of skyscrapers.
Drawing on available information on number of floors and ground floor area, similar CEM
models show that that autocratic skyscrapers have more meters per floors and meters
per ground floor area than otherwise similar democratic skyscrapers (see Appendix Table
A.16). Hence, when we compare particular buildings in autocracies with otherwise similar
buildings constructed in democracies, we find that skyscrapers constructed in autocracies
are more excessive, on various proxies of excessiveness.
The discussion so far has focused on how skyscrapers are often a waste of resources
(although to differing degrees, following our discussion of vanity meters). Yet, some
skyscraper projects are associated with economic benefits that outweigh costs, notably in
metropolitan city areas with limited space and high property prices, such as Manhattan,
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Table 3: Robustness test of skyscraper excessiveness: CEM-matching at the building-level
Percent Ln meters Absolute meters
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Polyarchy (above or below median) −1.48∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗ −4.09∗∗∗
(0.56) (0.05) (1.58)
Constant 13.70∗∗∗ 3.99∗∗∗ 53.91∗∗∗
(4.18) (0.40) (11.76)
matched subclass FE Yes Yes Yes
N 549 549 549
R-squared 0.26 0.23 0.26
∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1
All covariates lagged by 3 years
Standard error in paranthesis
New York or downtown Tokyo. While more fine-grained measures on property prices
in the exact areas where skyscrapers are built would be a great measure for capturing
the relative economic benefits of skyscrapers, comparable such data across countries and
time are unavailable. We thus use a cruder proxy, the extent of urbanization in the coun-
try in question, to investigate whether autocracies are less responsive to such economic
calculations when building skyscrapers. The underlying notion is that skyscrapers are
likely more economically efficient in urbanized societies, as they, on average, have higher
demands for offices, retail, hotel rooms, and housing in geographically limited spaces.
Model 1 in Appendix Table 14 extends our baseline specification with the logged num-
ber of new skyscrapers as dependent variable by including a multiplicative interaction
term between Polyarchy and urbanization. The negative and highly significant linear
term for Polyarchy suggests that autocracies systematically build more skyscrapers than
democracies in very rural societies, and the positive and highly significant interaction
term suggests that the difference is reduced once countries urbanize.14 Figure 4 further
illustrates the results from this model: The leftmost diagram shows that autocracy is
associated with more skyscrapers being built not only in very rural societies, but also
fairly urban up until where about two-thirds of the population live in cities. For the most
urbanized societies, there is no clear relationship between regime type and skyscrap-
14This clear pattern is robust to employing alternative dependent variables, such as (ln)
new skyscraper meters.
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Figure 4: Interaction between Polyarchy and urbanization, marginal effects.
Notes: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals are based on Model 1 of Appendix
Table A.14, with ln(skyscrapers+1) as dependent variable.
ers, as the 95 percent confidence intervals overlap zero. The rightmost diagram shows
that whereas urbanization is associated with more skyscrapers being built in “mixed”
and democratic regimes (i.e., regimes scoring about 0.3 or higher on Polyarchy), there
is actually no systematic relationship between urbanization and skyscrapers under more
autocratic regimes. Harsh dictatorships seem equally eager to build skyscrapers indepen-
dent of whether they preside over rural or urban societies.15
4.4 Investigating the proposed mechanisms
Finally, we assess which (if any) of the proposed mechanisms that generate the clear
link between regime type and skyscrapers. To recapitulate, we proposed, first, that
democracy may mitigate the building of expensive skyscrapers due to vertical account-
ability mechanisms. Well-informed voters could penalize politicians expending scarce
15In Appendix Section A.7 we show that results are similar when interacting Polyarchy
with GDP per capita instead of urbanization; autocracies build more skyscrapers in poor
countries, whereas the coefficient actually flips signs for very high income levels (where
there are very few observed autocracies).
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resources on wasteful project, thus disciplining politicians seeking re-election into not
pursuing these projects. Second, the typically stronger institutional checks on demo-
cratic leaders could restrain the building of skyscrapers, even if leaders personally want
them. Third, white elephant projects such as skyscrapers may be one means by which
leaders can please their core supporters, for example because such projects allow (in
particular autocratic) leaders to funnel resources to their core supporters, e.g. through
providing artificially inflated contracts, in corrupt countries.
Disentangling these mechanisms and coming up with definite answers to which one is
relatively more important is, admittedly, very hard. Yet, we can provide suggestive evi-
dence. While features such as institutional checks on the leader and control of corruption
are generally more prevalent in more democratic regimes, regimes display quite different
combinations of institutional features. There are corrupt (Indonesia) and non-corrupt
(Denmark) democracies, and autocracies with relatively weak (Zaire under Mobutu) and
relatively strong (Mexico under the PRI) institutional checks on leaders. The V-Dem
dataset allows us to capture such nuances, and track fine-grained institutional develop-
ments for countries across our entire time period. We employ V-Dem indicators proxying
for the different mechanisms in a very simple set-up, adding these variables seriatim to
our baseline model. If Polyarchy drops markedly in size and significance once a mech-
anism is controlled for, and the variable proxying for this mechanism is systematically
linked to the skyscraper measures, this provides suggestive evidence that the mechanism
is operative.16
Model 1, Table 6 replicates the baseline Model 1, Table 1 on (log) number of new
skyscrapers. The estimated Polyarchy coefficient is -0.08 and highly significant. Model
2 includes our favored proxy of the vertical accountability mechanism, highlighting that
16We write “suggestive evidence” since this kind of mediation test rests on strong as-
sumptions (e.g., Imai and Yamamoto 2011; Imai and Tingley 2012), and results can be
quite sensitive. This is particularly relevant here, since our argument suggests multiple
plausible mechanisms, and omitting relevant mediators may lead to bias if the included
and omitted mediators correlate.
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informed voters are a requisite for disciplining politicians into not pursuing wasteful
skyscraper projects. This proxy is V-Dem’s “Alternative Sources of Information” index
(ASI), capturing the extent to which the media is “(a) un-biased in their coverage (or
lack of coverage) of the opposition, (b) allowed to be critical of the regime, and (c)
representative of a wide array of political perspectives” (Coppedge et al. 2016a). ASI
correlates fairly strongly (.87), though not perfectly, with Polyarchy. Polyarchy actually
flips sign, to 0.01, but is statistically insignificant once controlling for this index. Once
accounting for differences in the information environment, democracies do not build more
skyscrapers than autocracies. Further, ASI is significant at 1 percent. This suggests that
informed citizens are critical for disciplining politicians into not pursuing skyscraper
projects, and this could, to a large extent, account for why democracies build fewer
skyscrapers than autocracies.
We do not find similar support for the other potential mechanisms. Model 3 includes
our favored proxy for the horizontal accountability mechanism, V-Dem’s index for Leg-
islative constraints on the executive (LCI). Polyarchy only changes from -0.08 to -0.06
when accounting for democracies typically having stronger legislative constraints (the bi-
variate correlation is .81), and Polyarchy remains weakly significant. Further, LCI is not
clearly separable from zero. Hence, there is little evidence that the proposed horizontal
accountability mechanism drives the relationship between regime type and skyscrapers.
One might speculate that the institutions theorized to constrain executives from pur-
suing white elephants could fail to work, in practice, if they are populated by actors who
themselves find such projects attractive. Our third mechanism points to situations where
leaders pursue skyscraper projects exactly because they are beneficial to key supporters.
One such instance is in environments that allow for embezzlement and bribes, as large
building projects provide great opportunities for self-enrichment for those involved. If so,
the association between autocracy and skyscrapers may be “explained” by autocracies
being more corrupt. The bivariate correlation between Polyarchy and V-Dem’s Politi-
cal corruption index (PCI) is .47. However, Polyarchy actually increases slightly in size
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once accounting for PCI in Model 4, and more corrupt countries are – in contrast with
expectations – predicted to build fewer skyscrapers.
We also tested whether autocracies build more skyscrapers because political power is
more strongly skewed towards economic elites, who may prefer building fancy skyscrapers
rather than prioritizing, e.g., schools or clinics for the wider population. As expected,
Polyarchy correlates (.62) with V-Dem’s indicator on how political power is distributed
by socioeconomic position (PPSP), and Model 5 predicts that the more concentrated
political power is with economic elites, the more new skyscrapers are built. The Polyarchy
coefficient drops when controlling for PPSP, but remains sizeable (-0.04) and significant
at 10 percent – it also lies well within the 95 percent confidence interval of Polyarchy from
the baseline. Hence, the evidence on this mechanism driving the relationship between
regime type and skyscrapers is not clear. Model 6 displays a model controlling for all
four proxies simultaneously, and results are stable for all the mediators. As in Model 1,
Polyarchy flips sign (0.05) but is statistically insignificant.
In sum, we find suggestive evidence for the notion that democracies build fewer
skyscrapers due to vertical accountability mechanisms; well-informed voters may dis-
cipline democratic leaders interested in re-election from engaging in such projects. In
contrast, there is little evidence that democracies build fewer skyscrapers because leaders
are checked by alternative institutions or because democracies are typically less corrupt.
5 Conclusion
We have argued that the lack of meaningful accountability mechanisms in autocracies
enable leaders to spend more freely on white elephants – costly and ineffective projects
that these leaders prefer for personal reasons. Historically, grand castles and churches
were the white elephants of choice. A more recent white elephant is the skyscraper.
Often remarkable buildings that stand out in the landscape, skyscrapers are sometimes
viewed as symbols of the power, glory, and greatness of countries and their leaders. But,
building skyscrapers is also very costly, and fully funding or subsidizing such projects
will often detract resources from more mundane investments in local roads, schools, or
31
health clinics throughout the country. Hence, while leaders and elites may adore them,
local populations have good reasons to be skeptical and limit the construction of large
skyscrapers, especially in poor countries where resources are scarce.
Our empirical analysis shows that autocratic regimes are more likely than democratic
to observe more new skyscrapers (and meters of skyscrapers) being built, even when we
account for country- and year-fixed effects alongside other relevant covariates. Further
analysis suggests that autocratic regimes tend to build more excessive such buildings,
and, in contrast with democracies, they tend to build skyscrapers regardless of whether
the country is urbanized or not. This further corroborates the notion that autocratic
leaders are freer to pursue projects that generate “private rents”, broadly conceived, at
the expense of wider society. Going forward, more systematic empirical research on other
types of white elephant projects and different proxies for rents, for instance assessing the
private residencies of leaders, would allow us to better gauge the extent to which our
findings on skyscraper projects are generalizable.
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A Online Appendix for “Autocrats and Skyscrapers: Modern
White Elephants in Dictatorships”
In this online appendix we provide additional information about the data gathering
process and the data material, before we present additional robustness tests that are
mentioned, but not displayed in tables, in the paper.
The first section gives an overview of the automated data-scraping routine that we de-
veloped to gather the skyscraper data from CTBUH (2016a). The second section presents
relevant descriptive statistics. The third section includes various tests where we have al-
tered the criteria for counting a building as a skyscraper, and other tests pertaining to
variations in our main dependent variables. The fourth section presents model specifica-
tions where we adjust the set of control variables. We present both more parsimonious
and more extensive models to investigate whether our results could be influenced by,
respectively, post-treatment bias and omitted variable bias. We thereafter present tests
using alternative different measures of democracy. The fifth section displays regressions
using the alternative 4-year lag specification, as well as results for (different) samples that
only draw on information from more recent years instead of extending the analysis back
to 1900. The sixth section displays the results from the first stage of the zero-inflated
negative binomial model. The seventh section shows results for the interaction models,
where Polyarchy is interacted with, respectively, urbanization and GDP per capita. The
final section shows Coarsened Exact Matching results at the building level when we use
alternative proxies on the excessiveness of skyscrapers.
i
A.1 Skyscraper data collection
All data on skyscrapers have been collected from the CTBUH’s website skyscraper-
center (CTBUH 2016a). This was done following a 3-step procedure:
1. We downloaded the webpage for each building with a so-called “wget-loop” in a
Bash script.17
2. We constructed a R-script that extracted the different pieces of information from
each page. All pages have the same setup, i.e., they have identical XML structures
(although the pieces of information on particular variables differ), making it possible
to create a generic script for all of them that recognizes whether a particular piece
of information is available for each page. While any procedure using the XML-
structure of the pages would work, this script relied on Hadley Wickham’s “rvest”
package in R (Wickham 2016).
3. We conducted a cleaning procedure on the information extracted. This included
removing duplicate information, cleaning text (mostly related to encoding issues),
and harmonizing vector-names.
All steps in this procedure are replicable. Please see WEBPAGE REMOVED FOR
ANONYMITY REASONS for all replication materials.
17Notice that step one is not mandatory, since R could connect to each page without downloading
them first. Step 1 simply makes it possible to work oﬄine.
ii
A.2 Descriptive statistics and sample
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics for main variables
Min Median Mean Max S.D.
New skyscrapers 0.00 0.00 0.23 70.00 2.01
New meters of skyscrapers 0.00 0.00 43.02 13221.00 376.80
New vanity meters 0.00 0.00 1.09 448.70 12.82
Polyarchy 0.01 0.31 0.41 0.94 0.28
Ln GDP per capita 203.41 2604.57 4468.56 42916.24 5065.15
Urbanization, share 0.02 0.43 0.45 0.97 0.22
Population (here shown in 1000s) 25.00 8101.23 32041.68 1297687.68 103471.05
Total natural resource income per capita 0.00 36.67 450.14 81161.85 2478.13
iii
Figure A.1: Mean construction time of building projects during the 20th century
iv
A.3 Alternative dependent variable specifications
The first table included in this section replicates our main results when we set the cut-
off for considering a building to be a skyscraper to 125m rather than 150m. (We remind
that the CTBUH database does not have full, global coverage for buildings shorter than
150m). The second table includes regressions counting only so-called “tall” (between
150m and 300m) and “super-tall” (more than 300m) buildings, respectively. The third
table shows results from when the main regressions are re-run (keeping the 150m threshold
for skyscrapers), but counting also industrial structures and telecommunication masts as
skyscrapers. The fourth and final table displays regressions excluding all skyscrapers that
have been demolished from the baseline.
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Table A.3: Regime type and the number of tall (150m–300m) and supertall (350m+)
skyscrapers
Tall Supertall
Model 1 Model 2
Polyarchy −0.07∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗
(0.02) (0.004)
Ln GDPpc 0.23∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.002)
Percent urbanization 0.13∗∗ −0.002
(0.06) (0.01)
Ln Population 0.05∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗
(0.01) (0.003)
Ln Resource Income pc −0.03∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗
(0.003) (0.001)
Constant −2.19∗∗∗ −0.17∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.05)
Country FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
N 8414 8414
R-squared 0.43 0.09
∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1
All covariates lagged by 3 years
Standard error in paranthesis
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A.4 Alternative independent variable specifications
The first table in this section shows regressions assessing sensitivity by omitting each
of the controls from the benchmark model, seriatim. The second table displays regressions
adding potentially relevant controls. The third table replicates the benchmark model, but
using a variety of alternative measures of democracy.
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A.5 Alternative lag- and sample specifications
The first table in this section shows the main results when we employ a 4-year rather
than a 3-year lag specification for all independent variables. The three following tables
show the main regressions run on delimited samples, including only years after, respec-
tively, 1945, 1960 and 1980.
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A.6 First stage of zero-inflated negative binomial model (second stage re-
ported as Model 5 in Table 1 of the paper)
Table A.13: First stage of zero-inflated model
Democracy-measure −0.59
(0.76)
Ln GDPpc −1.52∗∗∗
(0.29)
Percent urbanization −4.14∗∗∗
(1.31)
Ln Population −1.09∗∗∗
(0.12)
Ln Resource Income pc −0.36∗∗∗
(0.09)
Constant 34.93∗∗∗
(4.01)
Decade FE Yes
Continent FE Yes
N 8414
∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1
All covariates lagged by 3 years
Standard error in paranthesis
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A.7 Interaction between Polyarchy and Urbanization/GDP per capita
This section includes, first, a table with the model (Model 1) that was used for gen-
erating Figure 4 of the paper, pertaining to the interactive effects of urbanization and
regime type on ln(skyscrapers+1). The second column of this table displays a robustness
tests run with ln(number of skyscaper meters+1) as the dependent variable. The next
table displays equivalent interaction models, but now interacting Polyarchy with ln GDP
per capita rather than Urbanization. The accompanying figure displays the interaction
results from the first of those models graphically.
Table A.14: Interaction models: Regime type and urbanization
ln number of skyscraper ln meters of skyscrapers
Model 1 Model 2
Polyarchy −0.28∗∗∗ −1.24∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.18)
ln GDPpc 0.23∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.05)
Percent urbanization −0.002 0.02
(0.06) (0.26)
ln Population 0.08∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.06)
ln Resource Income pc −0.03∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.01)
Polyarchy*Urbanization 0.39∗∗∗ 2.06∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.30)
Intercept −2.62∗∗∗ −11.67∗∗∗
(0.28) (1.15)
Country FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
N 8414 8414
R-squared 0.44 0.41
∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1
All covariates lagged by 3 years
Standard error in paranthesis
xx
Table A.15: Interaction models: Regime type and ln GDP per capita
Ln Skyscrapers Ln Meters
Model 1 Model 2
Polyarchy −0.87∗∗∗ −4.41∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.55)
Ln GDPpc 0.19∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.05)
Percent urbanization 0.17∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.24)
Ln Population 0.09∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.07)
Ln Resource Income pc −0.03∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.01)
Polyarchy x Ln GDP per Capita 0.10∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.07)
Constant −2.59∗∗∗ −11.53∗∗∗
(0.28) (1.14)
Country FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
N 8414 8414
R-squared 0.44 0.41
∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1
All covariates lagged by 3 years
Standard error in paranthesis
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Figure A.2: Marginal effects: Interaction between Polyarchy and ln GDP per capita.
Notes: Point estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals are based on Model 1 of
Appendix Table A.15, with ln(skyscrapers+1) as dependent variable.
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A.8 Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) results, at the building level, on al-
ternative proxies of skyscraper excessiveness (Height/ground-floor area
and Height/number of floors)
Table A.16: CEM-matching at the building-level: Alternative proxies of the excessiveness
of skyscrapers
Height / GFA Height / Floors
Model 1 Model 2
Polyarchy (above or below median) −0.0004∗∗ −0.12∗∗
(0.0002) (0.06)
Constant 0.002 4.65∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.42)
matched subclass FE Yes Yes
N 318 544
R-squared 0.23 0.46
∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1
All covariates lagged by 3 years
Standard error in paranthesis
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